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NOTE
SNUFFING OUT TOBACCO: THE CITY OF ST.
CLOUD'S ATTEMPT TO BAN TOBACCO USE
IN THE NAME OF HEALTHCARE REFORM;
CAN EVERYTHING BE A SPECIAL NEED?
Matthew A. Swartz*
INTRODUCTION
I believe the ultimate goal should be a smoke-free society by the year
2000. - C. Everett Koop'
Smoking is a habit that, until recently, a great number of people
indulged 2 as it signified "elegance and sophistication in popular
culture."3 In fact, "throughout its boom period, from the 1920s until
the mid-1960s, cigarette smoking was generally regarded as a consumer
activity rather than as a medical problem., 4 However, "over the past
J.D. Candidate May 2004, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University
of America. The author would like to thank Prof. Perez for his guidance and
perspective, Prof. Duggin for her suggestions, and his friends and family for their
support.
1. JACOB SULLUM, Preface to FOR YOUR OWN GOOD (1998) (quoting
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, 1984).
2. Ann H. Zgrodnik, Smoking Discrimination: Invading an Individual's Right
to Privacy in the Home and Outside the Workplace? 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1227
(1995).
3. Kathleen Sablone, A Spark in the Battle Between Smokers and
Nonsmokers: Johannesen v. New York City Department of Housing Preservation &
Development, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1227 (1996).
4. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REDUCING
TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 34 (2000) [hereinafter
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 2000].
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few decades . . . smoking has become less fashionable."5 The trend
against smoking originally started in 1964 when the Surgeon General
of the United States declared that smoking could increase a person's
risk of cancer, chronic bronchitis, and emphysema.6 An essential
conclusion of this landmark report was "cigarette smoking is a health
hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant
appropriate remedial action."7
The history of tobacco regulation is as long and storied as the
research that went into detailing its harmful effects on humans.8
However, in light of recent Florida Supreme Court decisions, the City
of St. Cloud, Florida, (hereinafter St. Cloud) has taken the traditional
remedial measures against smoking one step further.
St. Cloud is primarily an agricultural town with a population of
approximately 19,000 people9 located in the backyard of one of the
most recognizable theme parks in existence, Walt Disney World.' ° In
fact, while some have called St. Cloud "a slice of old Florida,"" the
reality is that it is a picturesque example of how small-town America
has not been able to escape the pressures brought on by the rising costs
of healthcare.1
2
Nevertheless, as Donald Breeding, a sewer-plant worker in St.
Cloud, "grabbed a pinch [of tobacco] from his can of Copenhagen on
March 27, 2002 and carefully packed it against his gum"' he was
seemingly a world away from worries about the rising healthcare costs
that his and his fellow employees' tobacco usage generated. However,
5. Sablone, supra note 3, at 1227.
6. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SMOKING AND
HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF
THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, 1964 at 31-32. [hereinafter REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 1964]
7. Id. at 33.
8. Zgrodnik, supra note 2, at 1231 ("Since the early 1800s, states have
grappled with how to protect both an individuals right to smoke and the non-
smoker's right to a smoke free environment at the same time."). See infra notes
58-67 (detailing the harmful effects of smoking on humans).
9. Kevin Tse & Dean Foust, At Risk From Smoking: Your Job, Bus. WK.,
April 15, 2002, available at 2002 WL 9360719.
10. Marketplace Morning Report (Minnesota Public Radio broadcast, August
29, 2002)(Kai Ryssdal, anchor).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. April Hunt & Susan Jacobson, Tobacco Users Need Not Apply, ORLANDO
SENTINEL. March 27. 2002. available at 2002 WL 3038029.
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the freedom of choice that Mr. Breeding so innocently enjoyed that
day will no longer be the norm for prospective employees of St. Cloud.
On March 25, 2002, St. Cloud effectively stated, "[A] nicotine habit
[will] cost a smoker a job.', 14 This decision was based primarily on the
Florida Supreme Court case of City of North Miami v. Kurtz, in which
the court held that smokers have no privacy rights.'5 St. Cloud has
applied the dicta of Kurtz to its own situation by requiring new
employees, hired after the date of the ordinance, to "sign an affidavit
swearing they have been tobacco-free for 12 months." 6  The city
government, however, has taken its ordinance one step further by
"[requiring] new hires to submit to medical tests at management's
discretion to prove they aren't sneaking a smoke on the sly after
hours.'
7
This Comment focuses on the effect of St. Cloud's ordinance and the
degradation of individual privacy that potential employees will be
forced to endure through the unwarranted bodily search utilized by St.
Cloud. Ultimately, this comment will define the scope of the right to
individual privacy within our society. Once the right to privacy has
been defined it will be shown that the means chosen by St. Cloud are
over-inclusive of the desired end and that tobacco use cannot, and
should not, be controlled in the home or outside the workplace by an
employer in the way St. Cloud has chosen. Further, whether a privacy
right exists to use tobacco will not be analyzed within the context of
14. Tse & Foust, supra note 9.
15. City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 1995). Petitioner Kurtz
challenged the constitutionality of St. Cloud's requirements that all applicants
must sign an affidavit stating they had been tobacco free for twelve months prior
to their application. At trial, the District Court certified the issue of whether the
city could, in fact, maintain such a regulation even though tobacco use was not
related to job function. Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court found the main
thrust of the ordinance was to reduce costs and increase productivity while
"gradually [reducing] the number of smokers in the City's work force by means of
natural attrition." Id. at 1026. However, the court restated that the regulation was
not enforceable once an employee was hired. In its decision the Supreme Court
concluded, "individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the disclosure
of [whether they smoked] when applying for a government job." Id. at 1028. The
court went on to hold that elimination of costs represents a compelling state
interest and the City chose the least intrusive means because the regulation did not
affect current employees. Id. at 1029; see also e-mail correspondence with Eric
Nieves, Human Resources Director, City of St. Cloud (July 1, 2003, 12:10 EST) (on
file with author).
16. Hunt & Jacobson, supra note 13.
17. Id.
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the jurisprudence provided by the Florida Supreme Court in Kurtz8
but generally as the right to be free from unwarranted and
unreasonable bodily searches.19
In order to define the environment that has spawned St. Cloud's
ordinance, Part II of this Comment analyzes the history of tobacco,
emphasizing smoking ° and its regulation and usage. Next, Part III
frames the privacy aspects of the decision to prohibit tobacco usage in
the context of the applicable Florida and Federal Constitutional
18. See Kurtz, 653 So.2d at 1028-29.
19. This Comment will only address the Fourth Amendment search with
emphasis on the application of special needs. The crux of St. Cloud's enforcement
program is grounded on the warrantless, unconstitutional invasion of individual
privacy. Therefore, the issues of consent, waiver, and equal protection are beyond
its scope. See infra note 137. Moreover, one is forced to consult the Federal
Constitution to define smokers and, more generally, tobacco users' rights. The
Florida Supreme Court has already determined that the right to smoke, and,
arguably, any other form of tobacco usage, does not exist within the state's
constitution. See Kurtz, 653 So.2d at 1029.
20. Smoking is emphasized because St. Cloud has explicitly formulated a
regulation against tobacco usage in general. City of St. Cloud, Fla., Human
Resources Bulletin 2002-2003 (effective March 25, 2002) [hereinafter H.R.
Bulletin] is closely drawn from the Kurtz decision on smoking and deals with the
regulation of all tobacco usage. See infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
See also e-mail correspondence with Eric Nieves, Human Resources Director, City
of St. Cloud (July 1, 2003, 12:10 EST) (on file with author). Therefore, St. Cloud's
attempt to regulate all tobacco usage in general is founded on a principle that all
tobacco is equally harmful. Cf. SULLUM, supra note 1, at 277. Further, in response
to the notion that "tobacco is tobacco," Mr. Sullum argues that while "all tobacco
products pose some health risks, cigarettes are by far the most hazardous." Id. at
277. Further, "cigars and pipes are considerably less dangerous" with cigar users,
as researched by the American Cancer Society, showing somewhat higher death
rates, while pipe users experience little difference from the death rates of
nonsmokers. Id. at 278. Sullum has written a number of articles on smoking that
are published in such well-documented sources as Forbes MediaCritic, The Wall
Street Journal, and Reason. Mr. Sullum has documented the history and
percentage of his funding from the tobacco industry to refute the notion that he is
"a conservative commentator ... paid by the tobacco industry ...." See Author's
Note, SULLUM, supra note 1, at xi. Currently, Mr. Sullum is a senior editor for
Reason Magazine who writes about a wide range of issues. Mr. Sullum's work on
FOR YOUR OwN GOOD has been widely praised by The Wall Street Journal, The
New York Times, and The Washington Post. See Reasononline, available at
http://reason.com/Bio/sullum. shtml (last visited October 24, 2003).
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provisions.21 Subsequently, Part IV provides a framework for St. Cloud
to accomplish its underlying goals of reducing employee smoking in a
manner that preserves individual freedom of choice and protects the
right to be free from unwarranted, unreasonable searches of the body.
In conclusion, Part V applies this formula to legislating in the area of
smoking; it argues that legislation in this area creates a slippery slope,
ignoring opportunities to use less restrictive means of obtaining the
same results.
II. HISTORY OF TOBACCO LEGISLATION
I hope they price them out of my range, because I'm really wanting to
stop. - A Kentucky Smoker on the 1990 Tax Increase22
A. Tobacco regulation is nothing new to the world
The regulation of smoking, smokers, and other tobacco products is
not a program whose lineage began when late twentieth century
scientific research quantified the deleterious health effects of smoking.
In fact, history is replete with anti-smoking legislation, in one form or
another, dating back to the time when smoking was originally brought
to the Western World. Coinciding with the ever-present prohibitions
21. See generally FLA. CONST. art. 1 § 23 and Supreme Court case law discussed
in Part III.
22. SULLUM, supra note 1, at 119. Eventually, the American Government
learned what their European counterparts knew quite some time earlier, cigarettes
may be taxed. By 1864, cigarette usage had increased to the point where it was
profitable enough to subject it to federal tax. See REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL (2000), supra note 4, at 30. Additionally, regardless of the amount of
tax that could be placed on them, the American populous simply enjoyed smoking.
In fact, this "lack of enthusiasm for the anti-cigarette cause" could even be found
during the highlight of the anti-smoking crusade in 1915, as evidenced by the
following poem in The Penn State F roth:
Tobacco is a dirty weed. I like it.
It satisfies no normal need. I like it.
It makes you thin, it makes you lean,
It takes that hair right off your bean,
It's the worst darn stuff I've ever seen.
I like it.
(Graham Lee Heminger, "Tobacco" (1915))
SULLUM, supra note 1, at 34.
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placed on it, "from the 1600's until today, tobacco's popularity has
[experienced] ... its ups and downs.
2 3
What most people consider the modern day form of smoking was
originally brought to Europe by Christopher Columbus, who was
introduced to it by Native Americans in 1492.4 After Columbus
returned to Europe with tobacco seeds from the new world, smoking
rapidly became popular throughout the European continent.2 The
surge in Europeans' smoking was not without its opponents. One of
the very first, and most formidable, was King James I, who described
the habit as "loathsome to the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to the
brain and dangerous to the lung. 26 However, King James I quickly
changed his stance on smoking when he learned of the potential tax
revenues. 27 In addition to King James I, Johann Michael Moscherosch,
for reasons that are arguably more humanitarian, also viewed smoking
negatively, proclaiming in 1650:
They who smoke tobacco can be compared only to men
possessed, who are in need of exorcizing. While their throats
belch forth the stinking, poisonous fumes, they remain
nonetheless thralls to the tobacco fiend to whom they cling with
an idolatrous devotion, exalting him as their god above all
others, and striving to entice all they meet to imitate their folly.
One thing is at least it teaches them, the better to endure the
reek of hell.28
Moscherosch's view that smoking would accustom its users to the
"reek of hell" typified the ideals of "[t]obacco's more fervent
detractors [who] identified it as the Devil's weed., 29
While many people abhorred and still abhor tobacco smoking, it was
never completely banned throughout Europe. Moreover, many
leaders would not have stood for the habit except for one inexorable
fact - they could tax it. This mindset is best exemplified by Napoleon
III's proclamation "This vice brings in one hundred million francs in
23. David B. Ezra, "Get Your Ashes Out of My Living Room!": Controlling
Tobacco Smoke in Multi-Unit Residential Housing, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 135, 143
(2001).
24. Sablone, supra note 3, at 1091.
25. See Ezra, supra note 23, at 142 (citing RONALD J. TROYER & GERALD E.
MARKLE, CIGARETTES: THE BATrLE OVER SMOKING, 31-47).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. SULLUM, supra note 1, at 15.
29. Id. at 19.
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taxes every year. I will certainly forbid it at once - as soon as you can
name a virtue that brings in as much revenue.
30
Essentially, the mindset about the deleterious nature of
smoking prevailed through much of the European continent for the
next several centuries." Ultimately, due to the taxability, and hence
wide margins for revenue, smokers were allowed to continue their
32habit with relatively little persecution or interruption.
B. Tobacco regulation in early America
The popular American anti-smoking movement began in the late
1800s.33 In fact, by 1890, twenty-six states prohibited the sale of
cigarettes to minors, 34 while at the movement's peak in 1909, seventeen
states banned the sale of cigarettes altogether.35 Moreover, in 1898 the
Tennessee Supreme Court declared cigarettes to be illegitimate articles
30. Id. at 21; see also Harvey M Sapolsky, The Political Obstacles to the Control
of Cigarette Smoking in the United States, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 277, 284-
85 (1980) (stating that governments can, and have, come to depend on the
revenues garnished from cigarette smoking through the use of taxes).
31. In the seventeenth century, Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II, without
much success, banned "tobacco drinking" under threat of fines. Additionally,
Turkish sultan Murad IV forbade smoking under penalty of death and required all
places where smoking was found to be demolished with the assets of that place
subsequently reverting to the government. See SULLUM, supra note 1, at 20.
32. "European governments increasingly recognized that so hardy a habit
could be a valuable source of revenue." Id. at 21. While persecution did exist, it
was unenforceable at best due to the large amount of smokers within the
European population. Moreover, as Turkish writer Katib Chelebi stated, in
response to the Turkish Sultans repression of smoking, "[As the repression
continued] so did people's desire to smoke .... 'Men desire what is forbidden'...
Id.
33. Joseph R. Gusfield, The Social Symbolism of Smoking and Health, in
SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE, 50 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen
D Sugarman, eds., 1993). However, it should be noted that the previously alluded
to shift in smoking behavior had little to do with health concerns, which only
played a small (if any) roll in the formulation of public opinion before the 1950s.
Id. at 54; see also REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 2000, supra note 4, at 51,
Conclusion 1.
34. Gusfield, supra note 33, at 50.
35. Id.
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of commerce based on the assertion that tobacco was "wholly noxious
and deleterious to health."36
The Tennessee Supreme Court was not the only jurisdiction to
comment on the adverse public perception of smoking during this time
period. The Kansas Supreme Court embraced the opinion of the
Tennessee Court in 1920 by describing its "well-settled opinion that
the use of cigarettes especially by persons of immature years was
harmful, and the courts recognized that they were deleterious in their
effects. 3 7 At its peak, the anti-smoking movement counted more than
twenty-five states and over ninety-two different pieces of legislation
among its followers,38 with ultimately fourteen states invoking some
type of legal penalty against smoking in its various forms.3 9
Additionally, at the height of the movement cigarettes became known
as "coffin nails, little white slavers, dope sticks, paper pills, brain
capsules, coffin pills, [and the] Devil's kindling wood., 40
Nevertheless, the popular anti-smoking movement of the late 1800s
and early 1900S41 was quelled in the mid 1920s due to a variety of
factors, not the least of which was World War 1.4' Because the cigarette
36. Austin v. State, 48 S.W. 305, 306 (Tenn. 1898), affd sub nom. Austin v.
Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900). However, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled that cigarettes are a legitimate article of commerce. See Austin, 179
U.S. at 345. On appeal, the Court ruled that the state could not constitutionally
prevent cigarettes bound for other states from crossing its borders but could take
control over them once they left their original shipping containers. SULLUM, supra
note 1, at 31 (citing Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900)).
37. State v. Nossaman, 193 P. 347, 348 (Kan. 1920), error dismissed sub nom.
Nossaman v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 633 (1922).
38. Zgrodnik, supra note 2, at 1232.
39. Christopher E. Cobey, The Resurgence and Validity of Antismoking
Legislation, 7 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 167, 171 (1974).
40. SULLUM, supra note 1, at 30. The author goes on to show that the early
crusade against smoking was not only about social disparity, disgust, and reform,
but also about the negative health effects associated with the habit. Smoking was
said to cause "stunted growth, weakened immunity, insomnia, shattered nerves,
shaky hands, poor motor coordination, heart palpitations, cardiovascular disease,
high blood pressure.... and impaired ability." Id. at 31.
41. In contrast to the anti-smoking movement that occurred later in the 2 0h
Century, this early movement was based more on social stigma and a general
public perception of smoking being vile than any concerns about negative health
affects. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 2000, supra note 4.
42. In part, this decline was due to the popularity created by Prohibition and
the development of the advertising industry. While these were important, no
single entity probably did more to encourage smoking than World War I. In fact,
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"[served] as the essential sustainer of morale, ' 3 within six years from
its legislative anti-smoking heyday, all fourteen state laws regulating
tobacco were repealed from the legislative rolls."
In a matter of a few short years, smoking and the stigma associated
with it experienced an almost complete turnaround. In the time period
after World War I, smoking became a tolerable behavior, with many
states largely declining to legislate on the issue. 45 During the 1920s
through the mid-1960s smoking actually reached a "boom period." 46 In
part, this boom was due to World War II,41 which guaranteed an
increased customer base for cigarette manufacturers in the future.48 "In
the hands and mouths of movie stars like Humphrey Bogart and Bette
Davis, the cigarette became a pop culture icon . . . ., Ultimately,
WWI is credited with making smoking a part of the soldiers' everyday routine, so
much so that the New York Times observed, "Tobacco was included in the Army
rations. It was sold or given away by war relief organizations.... The doughboy
and his cigarette became traditionally inseparable." Cobey, supra note 39, at 173.
Additionally, General John J. Pershing, the leader of the American expeditionary
force, cabled his supervisors to inform them of tobacco's hold on the troops.
"Tobacco is as indispensable as the daily ration; we must have thousands of tons of
it without delay." See id. at 173. Pershing went on to state that, in order to win
the war, he needed "tobacco as much as bullets." RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO
ASHES 63 (1996).
43. KLUGER, supra note 42, at 63.
44. Cobey, supra note 39, at 171.
45. Zgrodnik, supra note 2, at 1232.
46. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 2000, supra note 4, at 34.
47. During WWII the big three leaders (Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin) of the
anti-fascist governments were all smokers, in addition to the supreme Allied
commander of the Pacific (Douglas MacArthur). In America, both MacArthur
and Roosevelt were staunch supporters of the cigarette. MacArthur's most
picturesque moments most often came complete with his corncob pipe clamped
between his teeth wading onto some foreign battle ground to rally his troops.
Roosevelt declared tobacco a wartime material and granted military exceptions for
those who chose to grow it. KLUGER, supra note 42, at 44.
48. Id.
49. SULLUM, supra note 1, at 44. Bogart was best known for his 1942 role in
the film "Casablanca" in which he used cigarette smoking as a means for
"[making] a moral statement about a world gone awry." Id. Additionally, his
counterpart, Bette Davis was the "prototypical female screen smoker.., for whom
the cigarette was laden with unspoken sexual language." Id. However, Bogart's
most moral statement about a world gone awry may have been when he
succumbed to the side effects of throat surgery to remove a cancerous growth and
died at the age of fifty-seven. See Bubbeo, Biography - Humphrey Bogart: To
20031
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because of the wide spread advertising campaigns and popular support
within the media business, by the mid-1950s more than a quarter of
women and an incredible sixty-eight percent of men in America
smoked 1
C. The modern day tobacco regulation movement
The smoking euphoria would not last long. In June of 1954 the
American Cancer Society released a study in which lead researcher E.
Cuyler Hammond proclaimed, "[C]igarette smokers had so much
higher death rates that we didn't think we could withhold the
information for another year.,12 Ultimately, this was bad news for the
smoker, as this was only the first in a number of studies53 that
documented the negative health effects of smoking.
All of these previous studies were mere precursors to the report that
"marked the beginning of a revolution in attitudes and behaviors
relating to cigarettes., 54 In 1964 the Surgeon General of the United
States released a report that helped to solidify the growing
consciousness about the effects of smoking by "consolidat[ing] and
legitimiz[ing] 15 years of growing evidence of the dangers of smoking
to health."55
While the report of the Surgeon General "established causal
relationships between cigarette smoking and diseases such as lung
Have and Have Not, available at http:/Ibogart-tribute.net/bio.shtml (last visited
Feb. 10, 2003).
50. SULLUM, supra note 1, at 114.
51. Ezra, supra note 23, at 144.
52. Originally, the 1954 study, which followed 187,766 men between ages fifty
and seventy for a two-year period, had planed to release its information in 1955.
However, preliminary information showed that lung cancer deaths were three to
nine times more common in smokers, while heart disease deaths were one and
one-half times as common. In addition, overall death rates for other forms of
cancer as well as mortality rates were sharply higher. See SULLUM, supra note 1, at
46.
53. See generally SULLUM, supra note 1, at 44 (citing Ernst L. Wynder,
Tobacco Smoking as a Possible Etiologic Factor in Bronchiogenic Carcinoma,
Journal of the American Medical Association). Wynder broke his subject down
into groups ranging from non-smokers to heavy ones and found that ninety-seven
percent of the patients with lung cancer were at least moderate smokers.
54. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 2000, supra note 4, at 40.
55. Id.
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cancer, chronic bronchitis and emphysema, 56 its effects were much
farther reaching. Inasmuch as it raised society's level of consciousness,
the study ultimately did something far more important for the popular
anti-smoking movement: it focused Congress' attention on the matter.
As a result of this new publicity, Congress in 1965 enacted legislation
that required warning labels on cigarette packages. 7 Additionally,
within just a few short years, Congress passed legislation banning
cigarette advertising on both television and radio."' As a result, the
second phase of the anti-smoking movement became largely due to
public awareness.59
In the wake of mutual congressional action and public
enlightenment, the anti-tobacco movement began to grow, albeit
slowly.60 Then in 1986, the Surgeon General again revitalized anti-
smoking fervor with a report that detailed the effects of second-hand
smoke.6' This report found that a nonsmoker inhales the same harmful
chemicals as smokers do, albeit in smaller doses.62  Further, the
Surgeon General coined the phrase "Environmental Tobacco Smoke"
(ETS) to distinguish between smoke that is directly inhaled by the
smoker and smoke that is inhaled by nonsmokers in proximity to
smokers.61 In a follow-up study conducted in 1992, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) listed ETS as a "group A" carcinogen,
which marks it a known human lung carcinogen. 64
56. Sablone, supra note 3, at 1091.
57. Id. Moreover, this is the quintessential slogan on every pack of cigarettes
and other tobacco products which states something to the effect of "CAUTION:
Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to Your Health." See Richard W. O'Neal, Close
But No Cigar: A Comparative Analysis of the FDA's Attempt to Regulate Tobacco
Use, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 481, 491 (1996-97).
58. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 2000, supra note 4, at 45. The Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 is found in Pub. L. No. 91-222.
59. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 2000, supra note 4, at 45 (stating,
"[Tlhe impetus for reducing tobacco use was largely medical and social").
60. Id. at 40. Here, the Department of Health lists a number of factors that
slowed the popular movement. Generally, the report classifies the movement as
being "impeded by the entrenched norm of smoking, a widespread practice fueled
by the persistent and pervasive marketing of cigarettes."
61. Sablone, supra note 3, at 1092.
62. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL: THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING 13
(1986).
63. Id. at 7.
64. Sablone, supra note 3, at 1092.
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The initial report of the Surgeon General in 1964 acted as society's
wake-up call. No longer could people emulate their on-screen idols by
dashingly lighting a cigarette without knowing what they were doing to
themselves. Additionally, "[s]mokers could no longer claim that
smoking was simply a lifestyle choice for which they alone took the
risk., 65 After the 1986 report detailing the effects of ETS, the anti-
smoking movement picked up even more fervor.
While the 1986 report only confirmed what was considered a social
irritation,6 it also provided an impetus for further legislation affecting
smokers. Finally, in 1986 the General Accounting Office promulgated
a ruling for federal office buildings which required "smoking ... to be
held to an absolute minimum in areas where there are non-smokers." 67
The latest blows to smokers have come on the heels of several
studies relating to productivity and costs. 8 Moreover, studies show
that workplace smoking leads to an increase in sick days and illnesses
65. Ezra, supra note 23, at 912. The author alludes to the fact that in 1984,
cigarette companies attempted to show that "passive smoking is a political issue,
not a health concern." Id. at 912 n.44 (citing Tom Post, Preserving Endangered
Products, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 1984, at 70, 71).
66. Long before the 1986 report a number of businesses had already begun to
limit smoking when it was under their control. In fact, a popular development that
epitomizes this was underway in the airline industry in the late 1970s and early
1980s. The airline industry's first step was to separate smokers and non-smokers
on flights. However, complaints were numerous and enforcement was lax as the
airlines were not about to alienate their tobacco-addicted clientele. KLUGER,
supra note 42, at 373-4. Ultimately, as the number of passenger complaints grew,
an overall increase in tobacco awareness led both the airline industry and the
federal government to mandate no smoking on flights by 1990. Id. at 706-7.
Additionally, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
proposed a ban on all indoor smoking unless a designated smoking area
specifically designed to keep smoke out of other areas of the workplace was
implemented. Jennifer Costello, The FDA's Struggle to Regulate Tobacco, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 671, 689 n.5 (1997) (citing Indoor Air Quality Regulation, 59 Fed.
Reg. 15, 968 (1994)); see also 49 U.S.C. § 137(d)(1)(A) (1988) (banning smoking on
domestic flights except to Alaska and Hawaii), and H.R. 4495, 103d Cong. (2d
Sess. 1994) (banning smoking on all international flights).
67. O'Neal, supra note 57, at 492 (citing 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.105-3(a)(1)(1996)).
6& See Ezra, supra note 23, at 909-10. Higher insurance costs and
maintenance costs are attributable to smokers. Additionally, studies have shown
that smoking can lead to lower productivity and takes time away from work as
employees venture to designated smoking areas in order to smoke. Ultimately, it
is estimated that the annual cost, in both lost productivity and health care, exceeds
$27 billion with upward limits approaching $61 billion. Id.
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for smokers as well as passive inhalers and directly impacts
productivity and efficiency. 69 Ultimately, with every new development
in the anti-smoking crusade, smokers have had to endure progressively
more intrusive regulation into their private lives.
III. PRIVACY
I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless
compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless
prohibited by some specific constitutional [provision]. -Justice Black,
U.S. Supreme Court7°
Anti-smoking sentiment is nothing new to the state of Florida. In
fact, it was one of the first states to actively pursue tobacco companies
in the second wave of the anti-smoking/tobacco movement.7" Even
local ordinances against tobacco users have been commonplace since
the 1990S.72 In fact, the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act (FCIAA)73 was
enacted to require the designation of areas for smokers and non-
smokers in public places, which includes hospitals, government
buildings, public mass transit, schools, libraries, courtrooms, theatres,
recreational facilities, and workplaces where the two groups are
• 74
intermingled. Finaly, it was the seminal decision by the Florida
Supreme Court in City of North Miami v. Kurtz75 that solidified the
69. Id.
70. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
71. SULLUM, supra note 1, at 181. Florida's Governor, Lawton Chiles, was one
of the first in the nation to proudly proclaim that he was going after the Marlboro
Man in what is commonly called the tobacco settlements in 1994 with the words
"We're going to take the Marlboro Man to court." This was closely followed by
many of the larger tobacco companies making deals with a group of state attorneys
general. Id. at 182-183.
72. Chad Scheer, Smoke Screening, ENTREPRENEUR MAGAZINE, Sept. 2, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 23027925. It was in 1990 that the City of North Miami set an
example by being the first to exclude smokers from the possibility of obtaining a
job.
73. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 386.201-.2125 (West Supp. 2004).
74. Renee M. Szobonya, City of North Miami v. Kurtz: Is Sacrificing Employee
Privacy Rights the Cost of Health Care Reform?, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 554
(1996).
75. City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 1995). See supra text
accompanying note 15.
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state government's right to discriminate against tobacco users in an
employment context.76
In Kurtz, the Florida Supreme Court relied on specific findings of
fact from the trial court that "each smoking employee costs North
Miami as much as $4,611 per year in 1981 dollars over what it incurs
for non-smoking employees."77  The court also determined that
because the city of North Miami was a self-insurer, taxpayers were
responsible for one hundred percent of these costs, which were mostly
in the form of medical expenses.8 At trial, the judge found Kurtz had
a fundamental right to smoke under the Florida Constitution,
specifically by the terms of Article 1, Section 23.'9 The Supreme Court
went on to state that while the scope of the Florida Constitution
"provides greater protection than the federal constitution, it was not
intended to be a guarantee against all intrusion into the life of anindividual.',80
The court held that a determination of whether an individual has a
legitimate expectation of privacy should include examining the totality
of the circumstances."' Ultimately, the Florida court decided that "the
City's action does not intrude into an aspect of Kurtz' life in which she
has a legitimate expectation of privacy ... [because] in today's society,
smokers are constantly required to reveal whether they smoke."
What is more startling than the court's interpretation of privacy is its
willingness to conclude "the City has established a compelling interest
76. City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 1995). See supra text
accompanying note 15. It was ultimately this decision that the City of St. Cloud
used as a benchmark for formulating its regulation. See also e-mail
correspondence with Eric Nieves, Human Resources Director, to Matthew Swartz
(Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with author.)
77. Kurtz, 653 So.2d at 1027.
78. Id.
79. Id. ("[Elvery natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into private life except as otherwise provided herein. This
section shall not be construed as limiting the public's right of access to public
records and meetings as provided by law.") (citing FLA. CONST. art. 1 § 23 (2002)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1028.
82. Id. In sum, it was concluded that because whether an individual smokes is a
question that he or she gets asked when attempting to rent a hotel room, car, or
even before dining, this information is revealed so often that there can be no
legitimate expectation of privacy about disclosing this information when applying
for a job. Id. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and
accompanying text infra note 105.
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to support implementation of the regulation." 83 By adhering to this
conclusion of law, the court indirectly validates the premise that
elimination of costs constitutes a compelling interest. Further, this
interest in controlling costs justifies the practice of eliminating smokers
through attrition. Additionally, because current employees were
exempt from the regulation, it was the least intrusive means of
accomplishing the state's cost objectives. 4
The problem with St. Cloud's decision within the framework
established by Kurtz is not that it refuses to hire smokers, but that it
has taken the reasoning of Kurtz and extended it to include random
medical testing. This policy has created furor in both the media and
the workers' rights communities, both of which focus on how far St.
Cloud actually goes to ensure that its rules are enforced.85 Because
many believe that St. Cloud has taken the proverbial high ground in its
stance against tobacco users, due largely to the requirements that
prospective employees sign an affidavit and submit to medical testing,
the action has triggered a conflict between smokers and nonsmokers.
6
Ultimately, this conflict over the St. Cloud ordinance centers on
whether tobacco users have a federally protected constitutional right
to use tobacco, an activity that is currently legal, and maintain a job at
the same time. According to smokers and civil rights activists, at the
heart of the issue is the privacy debate. In fact, both of these groups
have adopted the premise that "[b]y allowing an employer to regulate
off-duty lawful activity which is unrelated to job performance, the
Florida Supreme Court has significantly curtailed the right 'to be let
alone' in one's own home.,
87
This premise is based on the belief that the right "to be let alone" in
one's own home should be unfettered. As such, even if it is assumed
that St. Cloud could regulate smoking at work, the issue is not a
83. Kurtz, 653 So.2d at 1029.
84. Id.
85. Scheer, supra note 72. The article continues with an interview of Eric A.
Nieves, the human resources director for St. Cloud, who states that St. Cloud does
not plan on using the random medical testing provision except in cases where an
employee's "cheating becomes a problem." See also H.R. Bulletin, supra note 20,
at § C(2)(b) (in possession of the author) (emphasizing "the City's right to conduct
any form of medical examination or test" to determine whether he/she is in
compliance with this policy).
86. Scheer, supra note 72.
87. Szobonya, supra note 74, at 545. The author goes on to state that most
Americans do not want employers to have a say about what happens in their living
rooms unless it relates to on the job performance. Id. at 547.
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smoking ban on individuals in the workplace but a smoking ban on
individuals wherever they go, including their homes. Further, it is a
ban enforced by required submission to medical testing.
A. Defining the Scope of the Right to Privacy
The privacy debate can be split into two distinct areas. The first of
these is the general right to privacy, including the home. The second
centers on the Fourth Amendment and the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The main premise of this second
privacy argument is that while St. Cloud could control smoking on the
job, it is powerless to implement its planned medical testing because
the right to bodily privacy exceeds St. Cloud's right to conduct medical
testing.
First, the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken on the scope and
application of the general right to privacy, albeit not in the same
context. While a general right to privacy is not explicitly stated in the
Constitution, many of its provisions have suggested that such a right
exists. 8 In fact, in the early half on the 20 h century, Justice Brandeis
defined the scope of privacy in his dissent in Olmstead v. United
States:89
The protection guaranteed by the [Bill of Rights] is much
broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. . . . They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 90
88. Id. at 550.
89. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
90. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis developed his ideas
about the right to privacy, albeit in the context of tort, in a joint article with
Samuel Warren in the Harvard Law Review. Ultimately, it was stated that "[t]he
common law has always recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often,
even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands. Shall the courts
thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door
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This right is not absolute.9' As Justice Douglas explained in
Griswold v. Connecticut,92 "[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."93
As such, the challenge for smokers becomes enumerating a
penumbra within a specific constitutional provision as a prerequisite to
surmounting St. Cloud's regulation of tobacco users. This challenge is
faced in light of the suggestion that important governmental interests,
94
which outweigh those of the individual, may limit the right of privacy.
In the end, the distinction between various levels of privacy hinges
on whether the right in question is deemed to be fundamental.9 As
such, Justice Cardozo likely provides the most appropriate definition
for a fundamental right in Palko v. Connecticut.96 Cardozo asserts that
to idle or prurient curiosity?" Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,220 (1890).
91. The challenge as Justice Black put it, is to find a specific constitutional
provision that will uphold a smoker's claim to privacy. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at
508 (Black, J., dissenting).
92. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (In Griswold, the defendants
were convicted of violating Connecticut's birth control law, which forbade both the
use of contraceptives and the prescription of such. Subsequently, the petitioners,
who were charged as accessories, brought a constitutional challenge. The Court
held that the law forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes
on the right to marital privacy.).
93. Id. at 484.
94. See Szobonya, supra note 74, at 549.
95. Id.
Yet, this right is not absolute, which means it may be abridged by
important governmental interests that outweigh the individual privacy
interest. If the privacy right is deemed fundamental, however, state action
infringing upon this right is held to a higher level of scrutiny, requiring the
state to have a compelling interest before the right of privacy may be
abridged. Additionally, to protect this fundamental privacy right, the
governmental interest must be accomplished through a means that least
restricts that right.
Id.
96. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Palko was convicted of second-degree murder, but
at the time, Connecticut permitted the State to take appeals in criminal cases.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Connecticut set Palko's conviction aside and
he was retried and found guilty of first-degree murder in lieu of second. Palko
appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that his retrial amounted to double
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a fundamental right is one that implicates a "principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental . . . . ,9 The Supreme Court further clarified this
distinction by setting guidelines for what is involved when dealing with
a violation of a fundamental privacy right.
98
On the other hand, in Carey v. Population Services International,99
the Court recognized that the "outer limits of this aspect of privacy
have not been marked. .... "'0 Fundamental rights are now recognized
to encompass such things as marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing and educationY0 1 When faced with
jeopardy. Moreover, he attempted to plead that he was entitled to Fourteenth
Amendment relief because his Fifth Amendment rights were infringed. However,
the Supreme Court refused to extend specific Bill of Rights guarantees to the
states.
97. Id. at 325 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1937)). Justice
Cardozo continued his analysis of whether a right is fundamental by suggesting
that "[abolishing] them [would] not violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people .... .- Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105). Therefore, "if the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed
them, the process of absorption has had its source in the belief that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Id. at 326. In conclusion, Justice
Cardozo recognized that "it has come about that the domain of liberty, withdrawn
by the Fourteenth Amendment from encroachment by the states, has been
enlarged.., to include liberty of the mind as well as liberty of action." Id. at 327.
98. See Szobonya, supra note 74, at 550.
99. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). In Carey, the Court
struck down a New York prohibition on the sale or distribution of contraceptives
to minors under 16. In the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan stated that strict
scrutiny was required in dealing with restrictions to the access of contraceptives
"because such access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally protected right
of decision in matters of childbearing. Id. at 688.
100. Id. at 684.
101. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-191 (1986). Bowers was a case
in which Respondent was charged with homosexual sodomy in violation of a
Georgia statute. Subsequently, an action was brought by the Respondent to
challenge the constitutionality of the law. Although the actions happened within
the privacy of Respondent's room the Court refused to extend a right to privacy in
this case. The Court said:
[Pirior cases have construed the Constitution to confer a right of privacy
that extends to ... Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska ...
[describing] child rearing and education; ... Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson with procreation; Loving v. Virginia with marriage; . . .
Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird with contraception; and
Roe v. Wade with abortion.
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the opportunity to include other rights within the privacy concept, the
Court has generally refused to expand that list. In affirming their
position, the Supreme Court has declared: "Nor are we inclined to take
a more expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental
rights .... There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the
substantive reach of [the Due Process Clause], particularly if it
requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be
fundamental."'02
Id. at 190 (citations omitted). However, the Court also recognized that, despite the
act occurring within the privacy of Respondent's own room, proscriptions against
this specific type of conduct have ancient roots. Id. at 192. Moreover, an attempt
to claim that the right to engage in homosexual activity could not be considered
"deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 192 (citing Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). Further, "No connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the
other has been demonstrated." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. But cf. Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003). Lawrence expressly overrules Bowers and
makes two conclusions: "First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... Second, individual decisions by
married persons [relating to intimacy] are a form of 'liberty'...." Lawrence, 123
S. Ct. at 2483 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216, Stephens, J., dissenting).
102. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95. The Court had previously expressed fear over
Justice Cardozo's language in Palko by claiming a right to engage in conduct by
merely asserting that it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition ...
is, at best, facetious." Id. Additionally, the Court found that if the Judiciary took
on these matters itself, it would be relegated to the realm of super-legislator.
Specifically, it was announced that if these matters were in fact pursued, "the
Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without
express constitutional authority." Id. at 195 (as was "so painfully demonstrated by
the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 1930's .... ). Id. But cf.
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). However, simply because Lawrence
overruled the Bowers decision does not necessarily mean that the Rehnquist Court
has engaged in the expansion of fundamental rights. In writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy seems to concentrate more on the fact that the Bowers Court
embraced the history of prohibitions on homosexual conduct, citing specifically to
Bowers and the finding that "decisions of individuals relating to homosexual
conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western
Civiliztion." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
However, the Lawerence Court found "no longstanding history in this country of
laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter .... [P]rohibitions of
sodomy derived from the English criminal laws .... The English prohibition was
understood to include relations between men and women as well as relations
between men and men." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (2003). After recognizing
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If smoking is deemed not to be a fundamental right, the state police
power would authorize its regulation. 03 This authorization would be
valid as long as the regulation in issue is not "so irrational that it may
be branded 'arbitrary', and, therefore, a deprivation of [one's] 'liberty'
interest in freedom to choose [in personal matters. '1 °4 In fact, this is
the very position that the Florida Supreme Court endorsed in Kurtz.
By opening the door to increasingly inclusive regulation of smokers,
through finding no constitutional deprivation of individual privacy
interests in either the Florida or Federal Constitutions, the Florida
Supreme Court has ensured that these types of policies will be
permissible throughout the state.'05
B. The regulation in Kurtz is distinguishable from that of St. Cloud
based on both the nature and the degree of intrusiveness
The Florida Supreme Court's holding in Kurtz is distinguishable
from the right to privacy in St. Cloud's case, as it is obvious that
smokers have no right within the context of when and where they
that "'[h]istory and tradition are the starting point ... of the substantive due
process inquiry,"' id. at 2480 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 857 (1998)), the Court noted a sweeping change in the number of States with
laws that prohibited the same type of sexual conduct at issue when Bowers was
decided with the number currently prohibiting such conduct. See id. at 2481.
Justice Kennedy concluded, "The foundations of Bowers have sustained serious
erosion from our recent decisions in Casey and Romer." Id. at 2482. Ultimately,
Justice Scalia phrases it best when he states:
[N]owhere does the Court's opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a
"fundamental right" under the Due Process Clause .... Thus, while
overruling the outcome of Bowers, the Court leaves strangely untouched
its central legal conclusion: "[R]espondent would have us announce ... a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite
unwilling to do."
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Szobonya, supra note 74, at 550 (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247
(1976). In Kelley, a police officer brought suit under a civil rights statute to
challenge the validity of a rule that required him to groom his hair. The Supreme
Court determined that a rule of this nature was not so arbitrary as to be a
deprivation of the officer's liberty interests.).
104. Id.
105. Kurtz, 653 So.2d at 1028 (concluding that individuals have no expectation
of privacy in disclosing if they are smokers. Further, it was determined that the
City had a compelling interest to support implementation of the program and that
it chose the least intrusive means in reaching its end.). Id. at 1028-1029.
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reveal their habit. In fact, this is not the issue at hand."16  The
fundamental difference is how far St. Cloud is willing to go to ensure
that its policy will be an effective deterrent. Under Kurtz, individuals
could still smoke within the privacy of their own homes, regardless of
the costs associated with their subsequent medical care. Conversely,
St. Cloud is using the requirement of medical testing to deter choice
even within the privacy of one's own home.0 7 Therefore, because a
major part of the program deals with enforcement and control efforts
by mandating submission to medical testing, the regulation sweeps too
broadly: it infringes on the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
illegal searches and seizures.' 8
1. The Fourth Amendment Test
As the Court in Norwood v. Bain'°9 reiterated, "The guarantee of
privacy and security from unreasonable governmental intrusion
provided by the Fourth Amendment long has been recognized as
fundamental to the maintenance of a free society." ° The Fourth
Amendment is divided into two distinct categories, the more widely
106. The Supreme Court has already reaffirmed, "[W]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection." Katz v. Unites States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
107. H.R. Bulletin, supra note 20, at I (on file with author). Although the
bulletin makes no mention of deterring smoking, when employees who smoke
have to worry about being tested and fired, the effect is essentially the same.
108. Id. at C(2)(b). Mandating that, effective March 25, 2002, new applicants
shall be a non-user of tobacco or tobacco products for twelve months. Further,
upon hiring, the individual must remain a non-user as a condition of continuing
employment. Additionally, St. Cloud is insuring employee participation by
mandating the execution of an affidavit acknowledging both compliance with the
regulation and submission to random medical testing, in any form, to determine
compliance.
109. Norwood v. Bain, 166 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 1999). In Norwood, a class of
petitioners, all motorcycle enthusiasts, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging violations of their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights when they were
subjected to warrantless stops and searches at a police checkpoint instituted to
deter weapons at a motorcycle rally.
110. Id. at 246. In fact, the specific charge of the Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath of affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." Id. at 246-47 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV.).
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known of which deals specifically with searches arising within the
criminal setting."' Moreover, the Fourth Amendment mandates that
government intrusion into privacy through searches and seizures must
be reasonable. 12
Recently, however, the Fourth Amendment has also been implicated
in the context of civil matters "when such 'special needs'113 - concerns
other than crime detection - are alleged in justification of a Fourth
Amendment intrusion . . .., Chief Justice Rehnquist recently
111. In the context of criminal search and seizure, courts have generally
determined that in order for a search to be considered valid it must ordinarily be
"based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing." Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
112. Norwood, 166 F.3d at 247. The Court went on to say that the mandate for
reasonableness should act as a constraint on governmental authority to qualify
searches absent individualized suspicion. Id. Moreover, there must be some type
of link to state action in order to invoke Fourth Amendment privileges, and in
situations where the governmental link is tenuous, courts will look into whether
the requisite amount of state action is, in fact, present. See Ferguson v City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001) (stating that government actors are subject to
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment). However, in this case, because we are
dealing with the City of St. Cloud, the link to state action is apparent and will not
be dealt with in any length. Most importantly, "[tihe collection and subsequent
analysis of the biological samples required or authorized by the regulations
constitute searches of the person subject to the Fourth Amendment." Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 603 (1989).
113. The term "special needs" originated with Justice Blackmun in his
concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985). It was Blackmun's
opinion that there could be limited exceptions to the probable-cause requirement.
However, those needs should only be applied where the circumstance were beyond
the need for regular law enforcement which would make the warrant and probable
cause clauses "impractical." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
114. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997). In Chandler, candidates for
certain political offices were subject to drug testing in order to qualify for
nomination or election. Subsequently, an action was brought claiming that the
mandatory drug testing requirements violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the drug testing
requirement does not fit within the category of suspicionless searches. See also
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-666 (1989).
In Von Raab a union brought action against the Treasury Department claiming
that a program mandating drug testing for individuals who applied for a promotion
was unconstitutional. The Court held that the drug testing required was subject to
the reasonableness requirement but that the Agency did not need a warrant in
order to conduct the tests. Further, after balancing, it was found that the
government had a rational basis for the requirement. The Court thus suggests that
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described the special needs doctrine as "an exception to the general
rule that a search must be based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. '""5 Hence, the traditional warrant and probable-cause
requirements are waived if the evidence to be obtained is not going to
be used in furtherance of a law enforcement purpose.' 6 While the
special-needs doctrine should apply only in "exceptional
circumstances,"'1 7 it is generally accepted as an "exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements."" 8
there are different levels of searches under the Fourth Amendment depending on
whether the search is for criminal or civil purposes. Specifically, it is provided that
"the probable-cause standard 'is peculiarly related to criminal investigations."' Id.
at 667 (citing Coloroado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987), quoting South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976)).
115. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
116. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 88 (2001). In Ferguson, pre-
natal state hospital patients were arrested under a program implemented by the
hospital to reduce drug use. In the program, any expectant mother who tested
positive for drugs, specifically cocaine, was arrested and forced to successfully
attend drug rehabilitation.
117. Henderson v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351). In short, because it is the lower
federal courts that end up applying the law set forth by the Supreme Court, any
analysis of application should begin with the direction set forth at that level. In
Henderson, the most recent case since the Supreme Court has last spoken about
special needs with Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002), the Court had the opportunity and
availability of over ten years of Supreme Court holdings and dicta to back up its
special-needs analysis. Additionally, in Norwood v. Bain, 166 F.3d 243 (4th Cir.
1999), the Fourth Circuit had ten years of guidance upon which to base its holding.
Moreover, when the Supreme Court denied Norwood's application for certiorari,
it effectively validated, albeit indirectly, the Norwood court's logic.
118. Roe v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 299 F.3d
395, 404 (5th Cir. 2002). In Roe, parents sued the Texas Department and a social
worker under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after the social worker performed a visual search of
a child's body cavity without a court order. The Court held that the special need
proffered by the state did not justify the search, but extended qualified immunity
to the social worker because the rights violated were not established at the time of
the incident.
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2. The Application of the Fourth Amendment in a Civil
Context
The application of special needs involves a number of factors. First,
the government must show a special need outside the scope of law
enforcement.119 Of course, testing employees for the presence of
nicotine is inherently outside the scope of law enforcement because
tobacco use is a legal activity. Realistically, it should be the very
legality of the activity in question that makes this type of regulation
suspect in terms of a special-needs justification. Rarely have federal
courts held that prohibition of a legal activity could be supported in a
special-needs context."'
Next, even if St. Cloud could supply a justification for the
prohibition of a legal activity, regulating in this manner would not
survive the second prong of special-needs analysis. Here, the court
determines the government's interest in regulating in the manner it
chose.12" ' In other words, one "must now assess the constitutionality of
the search by balancing the need to search against the intrusiveness of
the search.' '12
119. The nature of the special need asserted must be divorced from the State's
general interest in law enforcement. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79.
120. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(affirming the government's claimed special need to drug test railroad employees
after accidents in order to protect public safety); Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(affirming another government special need in drug testing customs agents for
promotion based on the need for them to carry firearms and handle sensitive
information); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), and Bd. of
Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002) (both affirming a special need to test school students for drugs in after
school programs); Henderson v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming a special-needs search for a entry without warrant when the need
outweighs the intrusiveness of the search); Norwood v. Bain, 166 F.3d 243 (4th Cir.
1999) (affirming a search of motorcycle enthusiasts where the presence for
violence was great).
121. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 603.
122. Henderson, 305 F.3d at 1059 (citing Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78). The Court
further recognized that "the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on
the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests." Id. From this, the Court concluded that the
reasonableness of a situation depends on the context in which the search takes
place. Id. (citing New Jersy v. TLO, 469 U.S. at 337)
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Ultimately, the Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association summarized it best: "[P]hysical intrusion, penetrating
beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." '  The Court continued by
explaining that a determination that the Fourth Amendment is
applicable to drug testing is only the beginning of the inquiry, because
the "Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures,
but only those that are unreasonable. 1 4 Thus, the crux of the Fourth
Amendment analysis turns on what is reasonable.
The Court has established that reasonableness should be determined
by examining all of the circumstances surrounding the search and the
nature of the search itself.1 25 Therefore, in order for a search to be
valid without individualized suspicion, courts must undergo a context-
specific inquiry whereby they balance the competing private and public
interests. It is this balancing, struck by exploring the reasonableness
of the situation, that becomes the second prong of special-needs
justification.1 2 7
123. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616. Moreover, for those who say there are ways other
than blood testing to collect these types of samples for medical analysis:
"There are few activities in our society more personal or private
than the passing of urine. . . ." Because it is clear that the
collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of
privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable ...we
agree ... that these intrusions must be deemed searches under
the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 617 (quoting Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 175).
124. Id. at 619.
125. Id. (stating, "What is reasonable, of course, 'depends on all of the
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or
seizure itself."' (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,
537 (1985)).
126. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314. Further, in the language the Skinner Court
chose, "[Tihe permissibility of a particular practice 'is judged by balancing its
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate government interests."' Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). The Skinner Court continued by reiterating
that, generally, the balancing of competing interests is struck in favor of requiring a
warrant. See id.
127. Although the court will engage in the context-specific search, the standard
for government interest is significantly less than the probable-cause standard in a
criminal case. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667 (stating that the probable cause
standard is "peculiarly related to criminal investigations") (internal quotations and
citations omitted). In fact, "'[t]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to
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Eventually, the reasonableness of anyone's expectation of privacy
differs according to the situation.' 28 Yet, the Court has recognized that
the expectation of privacy at work is one that is "based upon societal
expectations that have deep roots in the history of the [Fourth]
Amendment.
, 129
Because one's reasonable expectation to privacy must be addressed
on a case-by-case basis,3 ° the situation that initiated St. Cloud's action
must be examined. In its regulation, St. Cloud made specific findings
that tobacco users caused increased losses to St. Cloud by costing more
money in health care premiums and through the use of more sick days
than non-smoking employees. 3' In comparing St. Cloud's regulation• 132
to ones existing in previous cases of drug testing, the Court looked to
"'the Government's need to discover such latent or hidden conditions.
. .to justify the intrusion on privacy .. .,,1"" The Court determined
that in the context of safety or administrative regulations the intrusion
constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not
justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner."'
Henderson, 305 F.3d at 1060 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768
(1966)). Or, as Justice Scalia put it:
[Ilt is a mistake.., to think that the phrase "compelling state interest,"..
.describes a fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern, so that
one can dispose of a case by answering in isolation the question: Is there a
compelling state interest here? Rather, the phrase describes an interest
that appears important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in
light of other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a
genuine expectation of privacy.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
128. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987). In O'Connor, petitioner, an
employee at a state hospital, claimed a search of his office without consent to be an
unreasonable search and seizure in the context of the Fourth Amendment.
Further, it was claimed that petitioner had a constitutionally protected privacy
interest in certain work-related activities.
129. Id. (citing Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)).
130. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 716.
131. See H.R. Bulletin, supra note 20, at I(A)-(B).
132. For the purposes of this analysis the cases dealing with special needs drug
testing is the closest analogous situation to St. Cloud's regulation. Because
nicotine is considered a drug it makes the most sense to analyze the present
situation in the context of other similar situations.
133. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829 (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668).
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on privacy would be reasonable to protect the public welfare.' 4 All of
these cases were premised on the specific need to protect the public
from the harms of illegal drugs.
St. Cloud's regulation will fail in the context-specific inquiry phase,
where the court measures the competing needs of both the public and
private interests involved."' The regulation must fail at this stage
because the private interest involved, the unreasonable Fourth
Amendment search, outweighs the public interest of saving money in
healthcare premiums. In reality, the public pays for smokers every
day, either through Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, or a number
of other government sponsored or controlled plans whereby people
who use tobacco are able to obtain benefits despite their habit.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the degree of
government interest required before a personal search is conducted. It
is clear that the Court has limited the personal search to instances
"where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, [although]
blanket searches calibrated to the risk may rank as 'reasonable' ....
[W]here . . . public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how
conveniently arranged."1
3 6
Furthermore, because smoking in public places is already banned in
Florida, the regulations promulgated by St. Cloud do not genuinely
protect public safety.'37 Because individuals are free to use tobacco
while working elsewhere, St. Cloud is merely curtailing personal
freedom of choice by utilizing the suspicionless search as a tool to
foster an anti-smoking campaign that provides an incentive: quit or
lose a job. 3
8
134. Id. The Court also cites the other cases dealing with suspicionless drug
testing including Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia.
135. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314.
136. Id. at 323 (internal citations omitted).
137. See Florida Clean Indoor Air Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 386.201-.2125 (West
Supp. 2004). For a discussion on the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act, see generally
Szobonya, supra note 74.
138. Whether employees of St. Cloud have made a knowing and voluntary
waiver of their Fourth Amendment rights by accepting employment is beyond the
scope of this comment. In order to address this issue any analysis would have to
encompass consent, a recognized exception to the unwarranted Fourth
Amendment search. See Schnekloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
Further, any arguments about waiver and consent would necessarily entail an
equal protection analysis, based on the fact that the government would be denying
employment to a specific group. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
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D. There is no need for St. Cloud to take a tougher stance on
smoking than government agencies, which have declined to
promulgate rulings on the matter
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)13 9, 29
U.S.C. § 651 et seq., the sole agency vested with the responsibility for
regulating workplace air, has yet to adopt a regulation to ban or
prohibit smoking in the workplace. In fact, OSHA disseminated a
proposed ruling in 1994 for public comment addressing indoor air
quality with a specific emphasis on workplace smoking. OSHA
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). In Murgia, plaintiff filed a suit based on his forced
retirement from the police force per a Massachusetts statute that mandated
retirement at age fifty. The Court first looked at the nature of the statute and
subsequently determined that government employment is not a per se
fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny, but that the rational basis standard is
much more appropriate for the type of regulation because "a standard less than
strict scrutiny has consistently been applied to state legislation restricting the
availability of employment opportunities." Id. at 307. The Court then found that
the state's classification rationally furthered the purpose identified by the State,
namely, public protection. Id. at 314. However, the purpose of the St. Cloud
regulation is to "improve, increase and enhance the health of City employees, and
potentially reduce health insurance costs." H.R. Bulletin, supra note 20 at I(A).
While the regulation may rationally further the stated purpose, the means chosen
to enforce the regulation, the random warrantless search, is the issue at hand.
Therefore, one does not have to conduct an equal protection analysis to determine
if this regulation would first fail under the Fourth Amendment.
139. Occupational Saftey and Health Act (OSHA) or 1970, 29 USC § 651
(2003).
140. OSHA has restricted smoking in the workplace, however, not in the
manner proposed by St. Cloud. To date, all of the OSHA regulations on the books
deal with smoking and its potential impact in highly dangerous environments. See
generally 29 C.F.R. 1926.151(a)(3) (2002) (relating to the prohibition of smoking in
operations where it would constitute a fire hazard); 29 C.F.R. 1910.107(g)(7)
(2002) (relating to smoking and paint spraying); 29 C.F.R. 103(b)(1)(v) (2002)
(relating to smoking near hydrogen storage); 29 C.F.R. 110(h)(12) (2002) (relating
to smoking at gasoline service stations). Of course, all of these statutes relate
directly to smoking and do not sweep into the realm of smokeless tobacco like the
mandate proffered by St. Cloud.
141. Melissa Vallone, Employer Liability for Workplace Environmental
Tobacco Smoke: Get Out of the Fog, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 811, 818 (1996). This
ruling followed on the heels of a request for information sent out by OSHA in
1991 to solicit public comment on indoor air quality. Moreover, OSHA has
discretion to regulate only in situations where a toxic substance is shown to
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proposed this rule based on its conclusion that the workplace is a
major location of ETS-exposure to non-smokers due to the high
person densities typically found in the office environment. 42  The
proposed ruling attempted to require non-industrial employers to
design and implement plans to protect employees from indoor air
contaminants.4 1 In response to the proposed ruling, OSHA received
over 110,000 comments,'" many of which voiced strong opposition to
the proposal based on cost.145
In addition to the comment responses, OSHA has been sued at least
six times in an effort to force it to regulate tobacco smoke in the
workplace.'4 The most recent suit came in 2001 with Action on
Smoking and Health v. OSHA.14" Ultimately, OSHA's position was
strengthened when the court held that OSHA's timetable for
implementation was discretionary.'4 Moreover, while more litigation
for a workplace ban on smoking is still pending, the prospects of a
definitive ruling in the near future are unlikely. Thus, the twelve-year
odyssey to institute a ban on workplace smoking will continue into the
foreseeable future.
49
establish a grave danger or significant risk to the employee. John C. Fox, An
Assessment of the Current Legal Climate Concerning Smoking in the Workplace, 13
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 591, 633 (1993). However, standing in the light of the
previous directive, OSHA has stated that "there is uncertainty associated with
quantification of any kind of risk [related to smoking]." Diane Threlkeld, OSHA
Indoor Air Quality Regulations Would Increase Health Care Facilities' Compliance
Burden, No. 11 HEALTHSPAN 15, 17 (1994) (hereinafter HEALTHSPAN).
142. See HEALTHSPAN, supra note 141, at 17.
143. Vallone, supra note 141, at 819; see also 59 Fed. Reg. 15,964 (Apr. 5, 1994).
144. Phillip Morris, one of the tobacco juggernauts, filed 5,000 pages of text
with OSHA on the last day of the official comment period. Id. at 819.
145. In fact, OSHA itself estimates that costs of compliance could reach $1.4
billion dollars (1994 currency) and costs to eliminate ETS altogether could run as
high as $68 million. However, these figures are slightly deceptive in that the
proposed standard would require buildings in which smoking was permitted to
have separate ventilation that exhausts directly outside. See HEALTHSPAN, supra
note 141, at 18.
146. Arnold W. Reitze & Sheryl-Lynn Carof, The Legal Control of Indoor Air
Pollution, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247,273 (1998).
147. See id. at 273.
148. Id. (citing Action on Smoking and Health v. Department of Labor, 100
F.3d 991, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
149. Joseph Fleming & Greenberg Traurig, Don't Be "Misinformed" About
Humanitarian and Civil Rights and Labor and Employment Laws Affecting the
Restaurant Industry, in REPRESENTING THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY: ALI-ABA
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In conclusion, the sole federal agency responsible for regulating on-
the-job indoor air quality has rejected demands to establish criteria for
general smoking restrictions within the private sector. 5° Therefore,
there is no reason for St. Cloud to create more restrictive regulations
by choosing to promulgate legislation that is far more sweeping than is
reasonable to protect a class of individuals that has not received
protection from the federal government.
IV. THE PROPOSAL
Regulation is not the issue here because tobacco use today remains legal.
-Justice Kogan, Florida Supreme Court'"
Recently, smokers have been enjoying the effects of a legislative
backlash against the outright banning of smoking and other types of
tobacco use in the private context. Moreover, what opponents of anti-
smoking legislation have generally referred to as a state sponsored
"jihad" 152 is starting to lessen. Yet, some proffer "It is our custom to
claim areas of our lives as private, [where w]e draw the line between
the self and the world [and mean], '[s]tand clear, . . . because I am
entitled to keep some information and parts of my life to myself.""53
Regardless of how one describes it, twenty-six states have agreed with
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: MAY 9-10, 2002, WASHINGTON, D.C. 747 (2002).
Of course, simply because OSHA has not, and does not, appear to be any closer to
formulating a standard for the control of workplace smoking does not mean that
standards for the control of ETS cannot be incorporated into an indoor air quality
standard.
150. Fox, supra note 139, at 663.
151. Kurtz, 653 So.2d at 1029 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
152. See Editorial, Butting In, WASH. TIMES, August 14, 2002, at A16, available
at 2002 WL 2916000 (The author refers specifically to the similarities between
today's anti-smoking legislation and "the 1600s, [when] witches were burned for
the glory of God." Further, the author continues to expand on his metaphor by
illuminating "the jihad" against smokers in the light of "'sin' taxes," established by
"anti-smoking zealots who have anointed themselves protectors of other people's
health, whether those other[s] ... are interested in being saved or not.").
153. Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's MyLife - Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job
Employee Association Privacy Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 47, 94 (1997).
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these sentiments by enacting, or currently sponsoring, legislation that
protects the rights of smokers within the privacy of their own homes.
5 4
Generally, states have insured smokers' rights by enacting three
distinct types of regulations.' These regulations prohibit employers
from discriminating against employees or potential employees based
on their off-duty habits'56 (often called "lifestyle discrimination"'57),
118unless those habits specifically affect on-duty performance. While
there are three basic types of protections that have been put in place,
each is unique in the degree of protection it provides and the overall
scheme employed. The first type of legislation is the general statute
expressly stating that employers should accommodate both smokers
and non-smokers.59  Secondly, several states have promulgated
legislation that specifically regulates the activities of employers with
respect to discriminating against employees because they smoke off
154. Scheer, supra note 72. Additionally, Arizona, Colorado, Illinois,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia,
West Virginia and Wisconsin have already protected smokers as a class in one
form or another. See Lisa L. Frye, You've Come a Long Way, Smokers: North
Carolina Preserves The Employee's Right to Smoke Off the Job in General Statutes
Section 95-28.3, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1963, 1995 n.10 (1993); see also Synopsis of State
Case and Statutory Law, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 157 (2002),
providing information on recent trends and developments in both case law and
statutes for all fifty states relating to public smoking and other tobacco usage.
155. Frye, supra note 154, at 1978.
156. Id.
157. Mark W. Pugsley, Nonsmoking Hiring Policies: Examining the Status of
Smokers Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 43 DUKE L.J.
1089, 1099 (1994).
158. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed these remarks in Skinner, 489 U.S. at
604 (stating that the Government has an interest in regulating the conduct of
railroad employees for the safety and benefit of the traveling public); see also Frye,
supra note 154, at 1978.
159. See generally ARK. CODE. ANN. § 25-1-102(b) (Michie 2000). Section
102(b) specifically provides that state agencies promulgate regulations that
consider both the rights of smokers and non-smokers. See also R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23.20.7-3 (2002) (mandating employers to adopt policies that accommodate both
the smoker and the nonsmoker), and § 23.20.7-5 (2002) (instructing employers to
reach "reasonable accommodation[s]" between the classes). Adapted from Frye,
supra note 154, at 1995.
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the job.16 Finally, the third type of legislation is the statute which
reserves the rights of employees to engage in conduct that constitutes
161lawful activity.
It is the third point, as annunciated by Justice Kogan, that St. Cloud
and the State of Florida should consider. By implementing legislation
that protects the legal activities of employees outside the workplace,
states are insuring protection for both classes of employees by
eliminating non-smokers' exposure to the effects of tobacco smoke
while insuring that smokers can keep their legal habit. Further,
legislation of this type makes sense both because of the current climate
toward smokers and the far-reaching implications that regulations
similar to St. Cloud's (which sweep too broadly into personal
freedoms) have on personal privacy.
Additionally, because smoking is still a legal activity, St. Cloud
should not be allowed to deprive an individual of employment while
benefiting, through taxes, from tobacco sales to that very individual.
While many businesses have eliminated smoking in their building, they
still permit it outside or provide designated areas for employees who
smoke.
St. Cloud's overly broad regulations have opened the door for
potential legislation curtailing the off-duty conduct of an individual in
a broad array of behavior. For example, while many would not
hesitate to agree that smoking is dangerous and that all levels of
government should take steps to insure the health of its people, not
many of those same people would be as amenable if the government
160. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 36-601.02(F) (1993). Section 36-601.02(f)
specifically states that no state employer may discriminate against any employee or
other person based on his or her use or non-use of tobacco.
161. Frye, supra note 154, at 1978. Generally, these statutes do so without
mentioning the smokers. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2001). Most
notably, the North Carolina statue makes the same distinction as the Supreme
Court with respect to off-duty activity that could detrimentally impact job
performance. The statute specifically provides exclusions where (1) there is a
bona fide reason for the restriction and it reasonably relates to the nature of the
employment, or (2) where the restriction relates to the fundamental objectives of
the organization. Compare Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997), with N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2(c)(1), (2) (2001).
162. SULLUM, supra note 1, at 156. The author states that one survey of U.S.
and Canadian workplaces determined that the percentage of buildings where
smoking was prohibited rose from 42 in 1991 to 71 in 1994. In fact, New York has
instituted a law where the street is one of the only places smoking is permitted.
This has forced many smokers to leave their office in order to go outside and enjoy
their tobacco. Id. at 155.
Snuffing Out Tobacco
permitted hiring criteria based on genetic information.'63 Based on the
Florida Supreme Court's reasoning in Kurtz,'64 employers would
naturally want to control medical costs through any means available to
them, even genetic testing.16 However, this line of reasoning creates a
"slippery slope" for regulation.' 66 Arguably, employers seek to
minimize costs by exerting control over certain behavior. 67 This is
analogous to the argument that testing for predisposition to disease
would also minimize costs by exerting control over not only off-duty
habits, but also the very genetic information beyond employees'
control. '8
Although this policy is allegedly about the health of St. Cloud's
employees, the ordinance is not fundamentally aimed at caring for the
health of its workers. While St. Cloud's objective is "improv[ing],
increas[ing] and enhanc[ing] the health of [St. Cloud] employees .... ,"
the specific facts that are set forth in subsections (2) & (3) of the
bulletin are based on the "increased loss experience of the group
health insurance plans" and (3) "increases in premium costs for
employees [being] borne by the General Fund and subsequently the
taxpayers.
1 69
While St. Cloud puts forth some compelling interests for the
curtailment of smoking, as there is little doubt that smokers incur
higher medical insurance costs,' 70 there is another way to handle this
163. See Jared A. Feldman & Richard J. Katz, Genetic Testing & Discrimination
in Employment: Recommending a Uniform Statutory Approach, 19 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 389 (2002) (stating that, as a result of advances in science and
technology, employers now have the ability to detect diseases and debilitating
conditions before they ever arise).
164. The Supreme Court of Florida found that elimination of medical insurance
costs validates a compelling interest in reducing smokers from its ranks. Kurtz, 653
So.2d at 1029.
165. Feldman & Katz, supra note 163, at 390 (arguing that another motivation
for an employer to use genetic results would be as a mechanism for controlling
costs associated with health care issues).
166. Kurtz, 653 So.2d at 1029 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
167. Szobonya, supra note 74, at 548.
168. In light of this proposition there are currently twenty-six states that have
sought to control this type of discrimination by enacting laws that prohibit it.
Feldman & Katz, supra note 163, at 390.
169. H.R. Bulletin, supra note 20, at I (A), (B).
170. It has been stated that smokers take more sick days than their non-
smoking counter-parts and increase health care costs by as much as $5,000 per
smoking employee. Mike Thomas, Just Think of it as Rewarding Nonsmokers,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, March 28, 2002, at Dl, available at WL 3038210. See also
20031
214 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 20:181
situation. St. Cloud could offset its loss just as easily by requiring
smoking employees to pay the premium differences for their choice to
smoke. As declared by one commentator, all that is necessary is to
administer employee compensation and benefits plans in favor of
people who do not smoke. " ' By shifting the burden on employees to
pay the costs of their habit, St. Cloud would maintain its compelling
interest in controlling costs while tobacco users would be able to
continue with their tobacco use.171
Nevertheless, there are some individuals who ultimately believe that
the government will still be required to pay for smokers through
Medicare or Medicaid, which would eventually vest responsibility in
taxpayers. However, these individuals misconstrue the issue at hand.
The government, and hence, the individual taxpayer, is ultimately
responsible for all individuals who make the choice to smoke,
regardless of who their employers are. This problem will continue
until the choice to either criminalize or extensively regulate tobacco
usage is made. 73
CONCLUSION
While the motives of St. Cloud may be commendable, and the goal
of a healthier society admirable, its chosen method is deplorable. By
regulating in this manner, St. Cloud is invading the private lives of
individuals, not only during the hiring phase but also randomly
throughout employment. Moreover, the instituted provisions are
Pugsley, supra note 157, at 1092-93 (showing that employees who smoke are
significantly more expensive to hire based on the extra costs they incur in terms of
absenteeism, life insurance costs, productivity losses, and even in terms of
attentiveness and productivity).
171. Thomas, supra note 170. However, choosing this type of action would also
create a slippery slope. If employers were able to pass on the costs of behaviors
that are cost creators to the employee, health care as we know it would be
drastically different.
172. A version of this has been proposed before, whereby the employer would
shift the burden to the employee to pay for his or her habit. Additionally, it has
also been previously proposed that employers carry a predetermined limit of
coverage for smokers, with the individual accepting responsibility for costs that
exceed this amount. See Szobonya, supra note 74, at 571.
173. As Justice Kogan explains, "If the federal government... chose to regulate
tobacco as a controlled substance, I have no trouble saying that this act alone does
not undermine anyone's privacy right." Kurtz, 653 So.2d at 1029 (Kogan, J.,
dissenting).
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overly restrictive of an individual's right to privacy while unacceptably
controlling the right to choose legal manners of behavior. St. Cloud
should re-examine its procedures and implement ones that pass the
burden associated with smoking onto the individual smoker. St. Cloud
has nobly followed C. Everett Koop's proclamation of an ultimate goal
to be a smoke free society by 2000, but does not heed his subsequent
clarification in which he states, "[WIhat I [meant was] not the complete
absence of smoking, but a society in which you will not find people
smoking in the presence of people who don't want it."',7 4 Ultimately,
the issue is not about smoking around people who do not want "it,"
but rather about using tobacco in the privacy of one's own home.
174. SULLUM, supra note 1, at 59.
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